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INTRODUCTION 
According to a significant body of research, policy aimed at supporting the cultural 
economy-- which encompasses fields ranging from the nonprofit visual and performing arts to 
commercial sectors such as film and music-- should emphasize investments in place and human 
capital (Florida, 2002, 2004; Markusen and Schrock, 2006; Scott, 2000, 2006). However, while 
attention to regional industrial dynamics and workforce needs may be crucial for successful 
cultural economy development, political and institutional factors can steer policy in response to 
other demands with significant impacts on urban development and urban governance. Recent 
work has examined the linkage between cultural policy and urban development, focusing largely 
on the ways that government and property-based coalitions draw on Richard Florida’s creative 
city thesis as a marketing tool to advance their interests in specific neighborhoods or districts 
(Catungal and Leslie, 2009; Catungal, et al. 2009; Indergaard, 2009; McCann, 2007; McGovern, 
2009; Ponzini, 2009; Ponzini and Rossi, 2010). Although this research focuses on the 
redevelopment projects and policies motivated by the creative city concept, little work has 
considered if and how coalitions may emerge to employ this discourse to foster alternative policy 
visions or directly challenge property-based regimes (Indergaard, 2009; McGovern, 2009). 
Further, although some have focused on the importance of geographical context and contingency 
in cultural economic development (Barnes and Hutton, 2009), and a few have examined the 
larger municipal policy frameworks for creative economy sectors (Leslie and Rantisi, 2006; 
Romein and Trip, 2009), none have studied this relatively recent phenomenon within the context 
and evolution of urban cultural policy in a city at large.  
This research addresses these issues through a case study of the evolving politics and 
practice of cultural economy policy and planning in Austin, Texas. What are the key factors that 
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influence shifts in cultural policy and planning over time? How do cultural sector coalitions 
interact and attempt to influence policy? Can and do cultural sector coalitions employ the 
creative city concept to influence the City’s economic development and cultural planning 
agendas? I argue that looking at the factors that influence the trajectory of urban cultural policy 
over time is crucial to demonstrate that contemporary policy is not simply due to the rise of the 
creative city discourse, but is an evolving product of past policy structures mediated by local 
institutions and actors that intersect with, but may differ from, land development and other 
governing interests. Moreover, by expanding the analysis beyond the role of the creative city 
discourse in downtown redevelopment initiatives, we can explore if and how this policy 
language may actually provide opportunities for those working within the cultural sectors to 
appropriate and reinterpret this concept to enable an alternative coalition to shift the direction of 
policy in their favor.  
The following section draws on institutionalist literature to frame the analysis of cultural 
planning and policy in Austin between the 1980’s and 2010. The case study contributes to the 
study of cultural policy-making and urban politics more broadly by tracing the ways in which 
entities within municipal government interact with and set policy through their engagement with 
cultural sector interests, redevelopment pressures, and the City’s larger planning agenda. In so 
doing, I demonstrate how aspects of the local economic, institutional, and political context 
establish a path for future policy and show how differences and power struggles from within the 
cultural sectors themselves frame new policy directions and organizational developments. In the 
case of Austin, I find that national and global trends-- such as the creative city discourse-- do 
create a framework for cultural policy and planning. However, specific contextual factors 
including prior economic development and growth management policy, departmental 
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organization, the forum for interaction between municipal actors and non-governmental 
coalitions, and the particular shape of the city’s cultural economy mediate these trends to 
produce policy outcomes. Further, the creative city concept provides a window of opportunity 
for both the City to strengthen its downtown redevelopment efforts and for an emerging cultural 
sector coalition to redirect the City’s economic development interests. However, cultural sector 
actors were unable to take advantage of this opportunity and shift the City’s long-standing 
amenities-driven cultural policy due to established divisions within the sectors themselves and 
the nature of the process for building a cultural sector coalition. Ultimately, the City supported 
expanding its cultural policy agenda when it aligned with broader economic development and 
smart growth goals, but rarely in support of cultural sector development itself. 
Studying the Political and Institutional Context of Urban Cultural Policy 
In the main, scholars have tended to focus on the rise of cultural economy policy as a 
consequence of market-oriented neoliberalism and the interests of local growth coalitions. A 
common argument for the current shape of cultural economy policy stems from critiques of 
Richard Florida’s (2002) creative class thesis, which states in part that cities should position arts 
and cultural amenities as assets to attract highly educated, skilled, and mobile workers. 
Following Peck (2005), a number of scholars argue that the rise of the creative city strategy is 
due to the fact that Florida offers low-cost, easy to implement programs that fit “business-as-
usual urban-development policies” (p. 760) and “work quietly with the grain of extant 
‘neoliberal’ development agendas, framed around interurban competition, gentrification, middle-
class consumption and place-marketing” (p. 740) (Atkinson and Easthope, 2009; Bayliss 2007; 
Gibson and Klocker, 2005; Long, 2010; McCann, 2007; Romein and Trip, 2009; Vanolo, 2008; 
Zimmerman, 2008). This assessment dovetails with Logan and Molotch (1987) and Stone (1989) 
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in that Florida’s creative city strategy is widely considered to be adopted and defined by a fairly 
traditional growth coalition of politicians, property developers, and other real estate interests as a 
justification and marketing tool for land development in the urban core (Catungal and Leslie, 
2009; Catungal et al., 2009; McCann, 2007; Ponzini and Rossi, 2010; Rantisi et al., 2006). In 
turn, the rising interest in place-based cultural economies has united the interests of growth 
coalitions with that of arts policy makers and flagship cultural institutions who view the creative 
city option as an opportunity to further their own agendas (Gibson and Klocker, 2005; Strom, 
2002; Whitt, 1987). Consequently, the creative city agenda serves to unite a disparate alliance 
with a shared interest in creating arts amenities to promote property development and economic 
growth, although the priorities of development-based coalitions typically determine the direction 
of cultural planning while those in the community art sector are stuck “focusing on funding 
advocacy rather than engaging in the creative city debate” (Markusen and Gadwa, 2010, p. 385; 
Peck, 2005; Ponzini and Rossi, 2010).  
 While the literature documents these issues in a number of cities, scholars have for the 
most part overlooked three important factors. First, increasing attention to the creative city 
discourse may not only be applied to foster central city development, but also may potentially 
create a window of opportunity for cultural sector groups and those in municipal cultural affairs 
to bolster and redirect cultural policies in ways that do not align with downtown redevelopment 
interests. Second, not only are members of such groups often driven by interests that are different 
from and may conflict with those of traditional landed growth interests (Indergaard, 2009), but 
given the variety of fields that make up the cultural economy, cultural sector groups are likely to 
be diverse themselves. This diversity may make attempts to build a coalition difficult and affect 
policy directions and strategies in and of itself. Third, while creative city strategies may seem to 
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dominate cultural planning and policy, this does not necessarily mean that cities have totally 
overhauled prior cultural policy frameworks or that actors do not attempt to create alternative 
policies within this framework. As such, because the institutional and urban development context 
will vary from place to place there is likely variation in the degree and types of debates that 
emerge over the direction of urban cultural policies (Barnes and Hutton, 2009). 
 To explore these gaps, this paper draws on institutionalist literature. Although applied in 
different areas of study including economic geography (Gertler, 2010; Martin, 2002; North, 
1991), political science (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010), and urban planning (Healy, 2007; Verma, 
2007), institutionalist analyses share a common object of inquiry. In general, this literature 
focuses on how institutions-- defined as the combination of formalized rules and regulations and 
tacit conventions, values, and norms-- channel the actions of individuals and groups within a 
given field. Institutions are distinguished from the organizational framework of governmental 
agencies and private and nonprofit entities, which take shape in a given institutional environment 
and within which decisions take place. From an institutionalist perspective then, the study of 
urban politics focuses on how “institutional regimes” draw on the structure and resources of 
formal political institutions and organizations to establish the “the rules of the game” that favor 
particular policy trajectories, alliances, and actors over others (Gertler, 2010; Martin, 2002; 
North, 1991). In this regard, because the “institutional inheritance” of prior policy structures play 
a significant role in shaping the path of future policy, policy outcomes are often path dependent 
and locally contingent (Davies 2002; Healy, 2007). This is not to say that exogenous factors are 
irrelevant,1 but that within the broader structuring influence of global economic forces and 
crises, urban policy and “economies evolve along distinctive paths that are shaped by their own 
particular constellations of institutional structures– their own distinctive institutional 
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architectures” (Gertler, 2010, p. 4). Moreover, policy structures or “rules” are developed and 
maintained not only by the availability of material resources, but also by “economic 
imaginaries”-- the specific discourses, symbols, and practices that actors rely on to legitimize a 
given institutional order and organize against competing imaginaries (Jessop and Oosterlynck, 
2008; McGovern, 2009; Rosdil, 2010; Sharp, 2007). As McGovern (2009) has recently shown in 
relation to the creative city discourse, values and alternative visions of the city can mobilize 
citizens to contest established practices in central city redevelopment. In short, both urban 
regimes and the coalitions that emerge to challenge them must work within the constraints of a 
given institutional context, which therefore, becomes a site of contest in its own right (Rast, 
2009). Indeed, institutional structures may be challenged in times of crisis or following key 
events that provide a opening for actors to deploy “path-shaping strategies” that alter institutional 
arrangements or lead to the realignment of coalitions as new institutional forms become layered 
upon pre-existing institutions (Davies, 2002; Gertler, 2010).  
 These insights are useful for the study of urban politics because they point to the potential 
role and influence of individuals and organizations outside the traditional business and property-
led coalitions, which the dominant approach to urban politics, regime theory, has tended to 
ignore (Imbroscio, 2003, 2010; Pincetl, 2003; Storper, 2010). According to Pincetl (2003), 
nonprofit organizations are underappreciated as regime players although they behave much like 
business and property-based groups by lobbying local political institutions and diverting public 
resources to further their own agenda, often in concert with business interests and other 
nonprofits (also see Strom, 2002; Whitt, 1987). This is increasingly the case with the rise of a 
new urban political culture where amenities and consumption take on greater significance for 
local governments promoting themselves as attractive sites of investment and as traditional 
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growth coalitions weaken or are realigned in many places (Clark and Hoffman-Martinot, 1998). 
Clearly, arts and cultural amenities play an important role in this regard. Similarly, while land-
based growth coalitions may play important roles in shaping policy interactions and outcomes, 
this focus often elides the fact that policy may also be driven by interest groups and institutions 
aligned with specific economic sectors such film or high-technology (Saxenian, 1994; Storper, 
2010). As Storper (2010) points out, sectoral coalitions may interact with institutional and 
political structures in entirely different ways and with different interests not only in relation to 
land use, but also in terms of workforce development and social policy. This issue is especially 
pertinent for economic sectors that contain sizeable numbers of small and highly interdependent 
organizations like many arts and cultural sectors. In places where such sectors are important to 
the local economy, they can potentially organize to negotiate with local officials vis-à-vis landed 
business interests. This points toward questions of how existing political institutions shape the 
development of specific economic sectors (in this case cultural sectors) and, conversely, how 
sector-specific interests influence local institutional and political structures. 
Case Overview and Method 
Drawing on these concepts from the institutionalist literature, I study cultural planning 
and policy-making in Austin, Texas from the 1980’s to 2010. Austin is a useful case study for 
this analysis not simply because of its popular representation as a “creative city” (Ankeny, 2010; 
Florida, 2002). Compared to many US cities, Austin exhibited an early recognition of arts and 
culture for economy development purposes and has actively cultivated its image as “Live Music 
Capital of the World.” Today, the city possesses multiple agencies that directly and indirectly 
affect a range of cultural economy activity. Further, Austin possesses high levels of cultural 
industry employment for a city of its size (City of Austin, 2006). While Austin perhaps 
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represents an atypical case of cultural economy planning, the city is useful to study because it 
allows us to examine policy over an extended period of time and to go beyond the focus on 
downtown redevelopment.  
Over the period of study, Austin MSA has grown from 585,000 in 1980 to over 1.7 
million in 2009. Although the region’s rapid growth has slowed somewhat from a high of 48% 
during the 1990’s, it continues to increase at a significant pace (36.4% in 2000-2009). Today, the 
region is predominately White (85%) and Hispanic (30%), relatively young (over 1/3 of the 
population is between the ages of 25-44), well-educated (38.7% are college graduates), and 
economically secure (median household income 56,218). As discussed in the following section, 
Austin transformed from a small university town and state capital to a center of high technology, 
which has helped to propel the region’s rapid growth (Engelking, 1996; Oden et al., 2007). 
Conflicts over urban growth became particularly prominent in the 1980’s and 1990’s as local 
organizations seeking to protect the city’s environmental quality and community character grew 
to influence the local political agenda and reinforced the city’s already strong reputation for 
liberal politics (Swearingen, 2010). 
My analysis relied on interviews and documentary sources to examine the key factors 
that influence cultural economy policy-making in the city with particular emphasis on the formal 
institutional and organizational context inside government. I also relied on these sources to study 
the roles and involvement of cultural sector coalitions in policy-making. I selected interviewees 
that, based on initial research, exhibited significant involvement in cultural planning and 
economic development in the city. Interviewees included directors and staff of municipal and 
quasi-public agencies (e.g. cultural affairs, economic development, conventions and visitors 
bureau), state agencies (e.g. Texas Film Commission), individuals contracted by the city to 
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author cultural policy reports, nonprofit organizations, industry representatives, and scholars 
involved in cultural planning activities in the city. I conducted multiple interviews with 16 
individuals that lasted 45 and 90 minutes in length. Although there was some variation in the 
questions depending on the subject, key questions focused on the respondents’ view of the 
following: the most important programs and projects for cultural economy development in the 
city; the key issues, events, and people that have influenced the City’s approach to cultural 
economy policy and planning over time and how the City has adapted these ideas to the Austin 
context; how specific agencies in the City incorporate arts and cultural economy activity into 
downtown redevelopment; and how planners structured the cultural planning processes and the 
challenges they encountered. Documentary sources included plans, program reports, and studies 
on the cultural economy produced by various public and public-private entities in the city over 
the last ten years and newspaper articles.  
Interviews and documentary sources were important to determine 1) how key actors 
define the cultural economy and the associated values guiding their actions, 2) the organizational 
framework toward the local cultural economy and its influence on policy; 3) how municipal 
actors interact with and are influenced by non-governmental organizations and coalitions; 4) how 
the economic and political context at the local level and outside the region influences actions; 
and 5) if and how local events influence decision-making. I study each of these factors and their 
effects on the creation and evolution of urban cultural policy and planning in Austin between the 
1980’s and 2010. In the process, I demonstrate how cultural economy policy affects and is 
affected by urban development, governance, and planning. Taking a longer view is crucial to 
show that such processes evolve out of a more complex and locally contingent set of factors than 
the rise of the creative city discourse alone. In what follows, I divide the case study into three 
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sections that trace the evolution of cultural economy policy and shed light on the ways in which 
the economic, institutional, and political context enables government to set a policy agenda and 
for cultural sector interests to influence this agenda to accommodate their interests.  
Cultural Amenities in High Technology Development and Smart Growth  
Although in the 1980’s and 1990’s Austin had little in the way of a cultural economy 
policy, this period represents the crucial institutional inheritance on which contemporary cultural 
policy is founded. Three key facets of the wider economic development and planning context set 
in motion Austin’s cultural development agenda. First, Austin’s efforts to become a high tech 
hub engendered a discussion of arts and cultural activity as amenities for economic development 
earlier than most US cities. Through the 1970’s, the city possessed very little high technology 
activity, and its economy was still dominated by state government and the University of Texas 
(UT) (Engelking, 1996). This changed in the 1980’s, as home-grown computer and software 
firms such as Dell formed and the research consortiums Microelectronics and Computer 
Technology Corporation (MCC) and Sematech located in Austin. This growth occurred in part 
through State support and due to the efforts of the Chamber of Commerce, local government, and 
various business groups. This tech-focused growth coalition pursued a three-pronged strategy to 
attract and retain tech firms by investing in UT science and engineering departments, providing 
generous incentives targeted to R&D-based activity, and promoting the protection and 
improvement of environmental and cultural amenities (Austin Chamber of Commerce, 1985, 
1998; Oden et al., 2007). By the 1990’s, this strategy had successfully positioned Austin to 
benefit from the decade’s tech growth when, in 1997, tech employment comprised 20% of the 
employed population (Chapple et al., 2004) and helped engender the 1990’s population boom.  
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Coinciding with the tech-based development strategy, the City boosted its investment in 
the arts. Building on Cultural Contracts, an arts funding program established in 1977, the City 
created a public art program and passed bond measures for the development or renovation of 
multiple cultural facilities in 1985. In 1986, it formed a cultural affairs division within the Park 
and Recreation Department (PARD) to manage these programs and reestablished a citizen-led 
Arts Commission to advise City Council (City of Austin, 2002a; n.d.). Although these programs 
coincided with the City’s tech-based agenda, there was a distinct split between arts and cultural 
development and economic development (tech or otherwise) both in terms of policy and 
departmental organization. Not only were all cultural affairs programs under the Parks 
Department, but they focused on the arts education and participation efforts of a financially 
dependent, nonprofit sector.  
A second factor influencing early cultural policy relates to the City’s growth management 
and redevelopment policy, which also bolstered the early amenities role for arts and culture. In 
short, the phenomenal tech-driven urban growth of the late 1990’s fueled anxiety over the 
negative effects on the environment and the city’s quality of life and character (Austin Chamber 
of Commerce, 1998). A key response to this concern occurred in 1999 when the City established 
the Smart Growth Initiative (City of Austin, 2008). Building off of a series of watershed 
protection acts dating back to the 1980’s, this long-range growth management plan created a 
“desired development zone” and a set of code amendments intended to both slow peripheral 
expansion and encourage development in the central city. This prompted the first concrete efforts 
to enhance cultural amenities specifically as an attraction for new residential and commercial 
development, particularly in the urban core. The initial program to address this objective was the 
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2001 Austin Sense of Place and Cultural Identity program (ASPCI, now Civic Arts), which 
directed public art and streetscape improvements in downtown redevelopment. 
Finally, since the 1960’s, Austin has possessed strong country, blues, and independent 
music scenes (Long, 2010). The city has become renowned for local institutions such as the 
Austin City Limits television program (1976) and the SXSW music festival (1987) and for 
nurturing artists ranging from superstars Willie Nelson and Stevie Ray Vaughn to indie legends 
Daniel Johnston and the Butthole Surfers. This reputation, along with the university’s enormous 
student population, enables the city to support a disproportionately large live music and nightlife 
scene, estimated to consist of over 200 music venues and 1,900 music acts (Austin Convention 
and Visitors Bureau, 2010; Cultural Arts Division, 2009). However, throughout most of this 
period, boosters largely considered the music and bar scene as more stigma than development 
asset. According to interviewees, it was not until the mid-1980’s with the attention to cultural 
amenities in the City-Chamber tech development strategy and the popularity of SXSW that these 
entities began to promote the city’s many bars as live music venues. This marketing move 
became clear in 1991 when the City adopted the slogan “Live Music Capital of the World.” 
Further, just prior to this, the City created a music commission to advise city staff and initiated a 
music loan guarantee program that backed loans for musicians and music-related businesses. As 
such, at about the same time that the City vaguely recognized nonprofit arts activity as an 
attractive amenity for tech workers, it provided direct support to the commercial music industry 
because of its contribution to the local consumer economy and the city image. Moreover, by the 
late 1990’s, the Chamber of Commerce had identified the “film and music cluster” as the leading 
“emerging industry” for the region despite its relatively small concentration of employment 
(Austin Chamber of Commerce, 1998). This initial distinction between a commercial music 
14 
 
industry and a nonprofit arts sector locked-in a policy path that set the groundwork for future 
policy dilemmas when the City looked more directly and comprehensively at cultural activity for 
economic development. In sum, this period provided the institutional inheritance in which 
cultural amenities served to attract development and affirmed music as the preeminent cultural 
sector backed by the City. 
Cultural Economic Development and the Rise of the Creative City Mandate  
 By 2002, the City began to look more seriously at cultural activity as a focus of economic 
development in its own right rather than as a supporting actor. To this end, it moved the Cultural 
Arts Division (CAD) from the Parks Department to the Economic Growth and Redevelopment 
Services Office (EGRSO), the City’s newly established economic development agency. In the 
process, CAD became responsible for cultural industry development (primarily film and music) 
along with arts funding and public art. This major organizational shift from nonprofit arts 
programing to a more comprehensive cultural economic development agenda occurred for three 
reasons. First, the dot-com bust stalled Austin’s tech economy and ruptured the existing tech-
based economic development path. As a response, the City formed the Mayor’s Task Force on 
the Economy (2003). The Task Force laid the foundation for the crucial path-shaping strategy 
that restructured the economic development agenda based on the report recommendation to 
create a new economic development office modeled on the three Task Force subcommittees-- 
traditional industries, small business and entrepreneurship, and cultural vitality and creative 
economy-- along with the preexisting redevelopment agency. A lead argument for this economic 
development organization-- and an indicator of the role of arts and culture-- was that the four 
subdivisions represented the City’s primary economic development areas and could more easily 
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interact under one agency. Nonetheless, as elaborated below, this arrangement would generate 
new conflicts and issues around management of cultural policy. 
Second, nearly simultaneous to the Task Force, the City conducted an audit of the 
Cultural Contracts program, which determined that the arts funding program was poorly 
managed and lacked “connection with broader City policy and priorities” (City of Austin, 2002a, 
p. 3). Like the Mayor’s Task Force, the report authors urged the City to move CAD to EGRSO, 
but only as an interim measure before establishing an independent, private arts entity.  
A third influential factor behind the expanded cultural economic development agenda and 
new Cultural Arts Division came from the wide embrace of Richard Florida’s creative city 
thesis. Florida’s research and his emphasis on amenities in attracting tech development directly 
drew from and thereby affirmed the City’s preexisting economic development and growth 
management policies (Florida, 2000, 2002). In so doing, his work provided the economic 
imaginary necessary to reframe and expand on cultural activity as economic development. 
Following the release of Rise of the Creative Class, Austin planning and policy documents began 
to exhibit a major linguistic shift toward discussions of Austin’s “creative community” and 
creative economy rather than arts and culture (e.g. City of Austin 2003, 2007; Interviews). The 
new language initially emerged in The Mayor’s Task Force, which redefined the target of the 
City’s amenities-based cultural strategy as the creative class rather than tech sector alone. As the 
report asserts, “Austin is not only a center of creativity, but…the creative sector here provides a 
relative advantage compared to the rest of the nation” (City of Austin, 2003, p. 9). The creative 
city imaginary provided a platform for reframing and expanding investment in preexisting 
programs. For example, the City hired a Creative Industries Development Manager to serve as a 
liaison to the field and the music loan guarantee program was renamed to embrace all “creative 
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industries.” Nonetheless, despite the broad emphasis on creativity, music continued to garner the 
largest and most visible support particularly in terms of programs to emphasize the City’s status 
as the “Live Music Capital of the World” including live performances at city council meetings 
and the airport. 
Additionally, as others have noted, the creative class agenda has been a significant force 
behind the City’s Smart Growth Initiative through its impact on redevelopment planning 
(McCann, 2007). In particular, the City has relied on the creative city imaginary to bolster the 
amenities-based cultural policy focus. For instance, in 2003 the City embarked on a Downtown 
Arts Development Study entitled “Austin Alive” (City of Austin, 2007). Study recommendations 
largely follow the focus on public art and streetscape amenities established by ASPCI, while also 
emphasizing the importance of the City’s cultural vitality and heritage because “talent above 
cash is now considered a city’s most valuable resource making a city’s arts and cultural offerings 
investments in its future economic viability…attracting bohemians, tech geeks, and 
internationally diverse people…” (p. 10). This program was significantly bolstered by a 2002 
increase in public art funding from 1% to 2% of new construction costs and a $31.5 million bond 
for the construction and renovation of six cultural facilities located primarily downtown. 
Additionally, the City has attempted to incorporate cultural facilities into new downtown 
redevelopment projects. For example, a $260 million W Hotel/condominium project will include 
the new studios for Austin City Limits due to the RFP, which required that a local cultural 
institution be incorporated into the development (Austin Chronicle, 2005). While successful in 
attracting new residential and commercial activity downtown, the City’s smart growth/creative 
class initiative has concomitantly spurred a wave of gentrification in surrounding downtown 
neighborhoods (Schwartz, 2005). This has led to discussion of the mounting pressures on many 
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of the artists and musicians that produce the amenities the City has put at the heart of its 
economic development and smart growth strategies (Spencer, 2008). 
Besides stepping up the emphasis on cultural economic development through the 
formation of CAD, these factors--  the Mayor’s Task Force, the arts funding crisis in PARD, and 
the institutionalization of Richard Florida’s creative city discourse-- paved the way for 
CreateAustin, the City’s first cultural plan since 1993, the largely unimplemented Austin 
Comprehensive Arts Plan (City of Austin, 1993, 2002b). The 10 year cultural plan, completed in 
2008 and partially endorsed by City Council in 2010, represents the most prominent attempt to 
reinforce and redefine the creative city agenda based on the Austin context. The purpose of the 
plan is to “identify Austin’s creative assets and challenges” and define strategies “to sustain 
Austin as a magnet for arts, culture, and creativity” (Cultural Arts Division, 2009, p. 9) because 
Arts, culture, and creativity are essential keys to Austin’s unique and distinctive identity. 
Creativity is also the engine of the new economy. The creative sector contributes directly 
and indirectly to community prosperity through generating economic activity, providing 
employment, making Austin attractive to today’s mobile knowledge workers, and 
contributing to Austin’s quality of life (Cultural Arts Division, 2009, p. 11) 
 
As this passage illustrates, the intent of the plan is to reinforce the City’s long-standing amenities 
and image-based approach within the language of creativity popularized by Richard Florida. 
At the same time, however, the plan represented a path-shaping strategy for cultural 
sector interests. As a local nonprofit arts director and central figure in CreateAustin confesses 
“We knew that we needed to sell this in that language…Austin is one of the cities that [Richard 
Florida] highlighted and one of the cities he has visited the most often, and so the language and 
the messaging that he promotes is very well understood and accepted here.” Indeed, while the 
plan continues to promote the City’s creativity agenda, it is also an ambitious attempt to shift this 
focus toward more direct and collective representation of Austin’s cultural economy workforce. 
In this regard, a major impetus behind CreateAustin was the adoption of the creativity rubric to 
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incorporate the traditional purview of cultural affairs-- nonprofit and community-based arts-- 
with the commercial cultural sectors like music that had become viewed by the City as economic 
drivers. The plan sets out to emphasize commonalities and address issues common to all cultural 
fields while providing a platform to boost communication within and between them. As multiple 
interviewees stress, the plan is intended to overcome the “siloization” of the cultural sectors and 
establish leadership to unite and represent the sectors collectively in a city defined by its music 
industry, albeit with an eye on elevating other art forms. As an individual highly involved in the 
planning process maintains: 
each one of the disciplines has its own world...[but] there are many individuals that 
practice a number of different disciplines and that move between different worlds…Live 
music, because it has been such a strong sector in what Austin is about, I think it has kind 
of kept that separateness. That’s what we’re trying to puncture.  But every other 
discipline is a silo too.   
 
CAD attempted to engender a collective vision and form a coalition around its artist-based 
creative city agenda in part through the planning process itself, which involved numerous focus 
groups and community forums overseen by a 70 member Leadership Council comprised of local 
arts, civic, education, and business leaders. Additionally, the plan’s three principal 
recommendations focus on establishing 1) a “leadership task force” to oversee implementation of 
the plan, 2) a “community-based Creative Alliance” to provide services and networking 
opportunities for those in the cultural sectors and 3) a “City Department of Arts and Culture” to 
consolidate and better coordinate cultural programs and funds spread across departments 
(Cultural Arts Division, 2009, p. 15). At the same time, however, perhaps reflecting the multiple 
and fragmented views within the creative sector, overall recommendations are wide-ranging. As 
a CreateAustin leader laments, “what you see in the plan [is everything] the community brought 
forward. The consultant – what he didn’t do was throw out the kitchen sink because literally 
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everything made the plan.”   
CAD also used CreateAustin as a means to reinforce the significance of the larger 
creative sector by reframing the long-standing fear over Austin’s declining quality of life as a 
creative city issue. The plan emphasizes that a dearth of affordable living, work, and 
performance space, inadequate funding, and problematic city ordinances are a threat to Austin’s 
“creative climate” (Cultural Arts Division, 2009, p. 18). In particular, the plan challenges the 
direction of downtown redevelopment on the grounds that escalating rents may displace 
significant segments of the creative workforce and addresses conflicts over land use and noise 
ordinances between the new residential development and the established live music venues. In 
using the plan as a path-shaping strategy, CAD and CreateAustin leaders not only attempted to 
redefine the creative city imaginary, but more of a threat to EGRSO and the Mayor’s office, put 
in question the smart growth and development agenda, which the City had invested in for over 
twenty years.  
The Struggle to Implement the Creative City Agenda  
 During the two years following completion of CreateAustin, planners have focused their 
efforts on strengthening the creative coalition through plan recommendations related to creative 
services and networking and that which requires little or no funding. To this end, a fledgling 
Creative Alliance has emerged to market the CreateAustin brand and advocate on behalf of the 
arts and cultural sectors. Additionally, between 2008 and 2010, CAD provided seminars on 
various arts management and professional development topics with grants from the NEA and the 
Texas Commission on the Arts and co-sponsored speaking engagements with community arts 
organization leaders. Finally, CreateAustin leaders have worked to insert the language of 
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creativity (over arts and culture) into the soon to be released Downtown Plan and serve in 
advisory positions to the on-going comprehensive plan, Imagine Austin. 
 These efforts have all occurred prior to the City’s approval of CreateAustin and, as the 
City Council acknowledges, without “an investment of new resources or the official support of 
the City Council” (City of Austin, 2010a). In fact, Council did not endorse the plan until June 
2010-- two years after its completion-- and it did so partially and without dedicated funding. 
Rather, the 2010 Council resolution formally endorsing the plan calls for:  
• the formation of a “City/Community Accountability Working Group” to monitor plan 
implementation (Create Austin recommendation #1), 
• to “continue to explore” the formation of a “creative enterprise” division (similar to 
Create Austin recommendation #3), 
• the comprehensive planning process to “embrace the creative enterprises as a vital and 
economically beneficial component” and that Comprehensive Plan recommendations 
“integrate the CreateAustin Cultural Master Plan” (City of Austin, 2010a).  
 
In short, the request to form an Accountability Working Group is the only action in the 
resolution not already under way and, since no funding was committed to implement the plan, 
the group has little to oversee. As such, while CreateAustin established a foundation to broaden 
and redefine the creative city agenda, and plan leaders have been able to realize some of their 
goals, they have not altered the prior development agenda in a substantive way. Further, the plan 
has not only met resistance from city government. The guiding concept of the planning process 
as a tool to imagine, produce, and activate a creative coalition has brought to the surface latent 
points of divergence and sparked resistance from some within the cultural sectors themselves. 
Five key issues account for the inability to transform the creative city imaginary, form a 
coalition around this concept, and redirect cultural economy policy. First, some centrally 
involved in CreateAustin expressed frustration that they failed to establish sustained connections 
with Austin’s political leadership both during the planning process and subsequently. Although 
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former mayor Will Wynn (2003-2009) served as Honorary Chair on the Leadership Council, no 
current City Council members were involved in the process directly or served on the Leadership 
Taskforce (Cultural Arts Division, 2009). Moreover, multiple sources identified resistance from 
EGRSO as a major hurdle in the planning process and approval of CreateAustin. For one, the 
impetus for CreateAustin was not based on EGRSO directive, but due to CAD’s award of two 
NEA grants for cultural assessment and planning. Subsequently, upon completion, the EGRSO 
director prevented the plan from going before City Council for nearly six months due to the 
presumed threat to the division’s budget authority and the potentially high level of investment 
that the plan entailed. In fact, the key plan recommendation for an arts and culture division 
separate from EGRSO, which would require an organizational and budget revision, has been 
under consideration since the completion of CreateAustin. In effect, city officials opposed the 
implementation of an alternative creative city agenda because it would significantly alter a key 
component of the City’s economic development agenda and, for EGRSO, diminish their power 
and resources, and CAD possessed no political capital to mount a challenge. 
 Second, this situation is exasperated by the organizational framework for cultural 
activity. CAD is located in a department with an economic development mandate and managed 
by individuals that lack a background in the arts and culture. Some CAD staff feel that EGRSO 
management not only fail to recognize the full economic contribution of the cultural sectors, but 
also ignore that which does not reflect the economic development agenda. By not actively 
addressing the institutional differences between cultural affairs and economic development, the 
potential for miscommunication and misunderstanding between CAD, EGRSO management, and 
the other EGRSO subdivisions increased. Indeed, despite the initial recognition of the cultural 
economy that led to CAD’s formation and home in EGRSO where the agency could work 
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closely with the other economic development subdivisions, there has been little direct 
partnership or cooperative programs. The Small Business division, for example, reports that they 
rarely assist individuals in arts or design-related fields and typically refer contacts to CAD 
because, as one source states, “they speak their language, we don’t.” Further organizational 
complexity exists due to the existence of separate arts, music, and live music commissions, a 
new Music Division separate from CAD, and cultural activities housed in the Parks Department 
that, contrary to the spirit of CreateAustin, create field-specific channels of representation and 
produce a fragmented decision-making structure. The City has, however, acknowledged this 
issue in the CreateAustin endorsement.  
 Third, as noted above, the nature of CreateAustin makes implementation potentially 
difficult. In the first place, the plan’s broad target of the “creative sector” encompasses a diverse 
body of activity in commercial, nonprofit, and informal sectors primarily related to the arts and 
culture but not exclusively (e.g. gaming and digital media). Although the plan incorporates a 
wide scope of activity and identifies important issues that cut across all cultural sectors, 
recommendations tend to reflect issues that are more pertinent to the nonprofit arts (e.g. 
philanthropy, cultural tourism marketing and audience development). This creates a wedge 
within the larger creative sector CAD seeks to represent. 
Indeed, a fourth factor is that the alternative creative city imaginary and policy path 
represented by CreateAustin threatened not only EGRSO, but those in the music sector that 
benefited most from the City’s existing cultural economy policy. As such, just as the plan 
supplied a platform to unify the cultural sectors, it simultaneously opened up fractures from 
within because the music sector felt its dominant position threatened. In some sense, given the 
aforementioned bias toward the nonprofit arts sector in plan recommendations as well as in the 
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composition of the Leadership Council-- 21 individuals (30%) represent the nonprofit 
visual/performing arts while 4 (5%) represent the music industry-- CreateAustin can be read as a 
means for the arts to assert power under the creative city rhetoric.2  
Against this potential bias and the City’s ignorance of key music sector issues (primarily 
a conflict over noise ordinances due to downtown residential development), music sector 
interests formed a Live Music Task Force (2008) in January 2008 (report completed in 
November 2008), only months prior to the completion of CreateAustin. CreateAustin leaders 
assert that the organization of a separate plan not only deflated the CreateAustin agenda, but that 
it contains almost identical recommendations to their own work framed for live music rather than 
all creative producers. Further, the top recommendation to come from the taskforce was for the 
City to establish a Music Division that would report directly to the assistant city manager-- 
independent of CAD-- “because of its focus on the ‘for profit’ nature and activity of live music 
and the role it plays in economic development” (Live Music Task Force, 2008, p. 2). In response, 
much to the chagrin of CreateAustin planners, the City formed a Music Division independent of 
CAD in January 2010, six months before any portion of that plan was endorsed by City Council. 
In short, this power struggle and the subsequent fragmentation of the “creative community” 
further weakened CAD’s efforts to initiate an alternative creative city agenda. 
 The final factor contributing to Austin’s cultural planning struggle is the recognition of a 
recession in late 2008, which rather than serving as a path-shaping event like the prior recession, 
has served as a rationale for City inaction. Although Forbes Magazine recently identified Austin 
as poised for rapid economic recovery, the City has endured a budget deficit of over $11 million 
in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 and, as of April 2010, the deficit more than doubled to $28.1 
million with forecasts of a deficit for the next three years (Austin Business Journal, 2010; Flener 
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2010; Ott, 2010). Moreover, although sales tax income has steadily increased since February 
2010, the City endured declining receipts over the last two years (City of Austin, 2010b). Finally, 
in 2009, Hotel Occupancy Tax (HOT) receipts were down 9% to $46.4 million and the City 
anticipates $42.3 million in 2010. Though EGRSO has sustained minimal cuts to its operating 
budget, it has withheld funding for the maintenance of city-owned public art and received less 
funding for Cultural Contracts, which provides grants to local artists and arts groups through the 
hotel tax income. This has dropped from $5.4 million in 2009 to $4.9 million in 2010 (City of 
Austin, 2010b) due to the loss of HOT revenue. 
In contrast to a decade ago when recession spurred Austin to identify options for 
diversifying its economic base and moving beyond traditional economic development strategies 
through the creative economy (e.g. Mayor’s Taskforce), the current recession has seemingly had 
the opposite effect. As current Mayor Lee Leffingwell expressed in a 2009 candidate forum 
before his election, “I don't believe that all city services are equal in a time of economic crisis; if 
we have to choose, public safety is more important than public art” (Austin American Statesman, 
2009). Following this sentiment, recessionary budget problems have jusified the resistance from 
the assistant city manager and EGRSO to CreateAustin as well as compound internal divisions in 
the cultural community. CAD and CreateAustin leaders point to the new expenditures and staff 
associated with the implementation of CreateAustin projects, particularly the proposal for a 
separate cultural division, as the City’s rationale for postponing approval of the plan, though 
there was a lack of support prior to the recession and the City established the new Music 
Division during recession. Moreover, the City is reconsidering programs that suggest it may be 
backing away from its creative city image. In particular, EGRSO is currently reviewing new 
regulations for HOT revenue encouraged by a struggling tourism industry (Alberts, 2010). 
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Currently, CAD receives 12% of the HOT annually to fund artists and arts groups based on a 
broad interpretation of the fund that the arts attract visitors by boosting Austin’s reputation as a 
creative city. However, the Texas Hotel Lobby has pushed for a more strict interpretation that 
would distribute funds only to programs that can quantify their tourism impact. In other words, 
not only has the City resisted attempts to expand the creative city agenda, but also it calls into 
question that which does not make a measurable contribution to city revenues. 
CONCLUSION  
This article examined the key factors that influence shifts in cultural economy planning 
and policy-making in Austin, TX and, in the process, focused on how these factors paved the 
way for efforts-- largely unsuccessful-- to move the cultural planning agenda from a central city, 
amenities-driven agenda to one that more directly supports the cultural sectors. This approach 
was motivated by an attempt to address three issues generally overlooked in the cultural 
economy policy literature-- attempts by groups to reinterpret the creative city discourse for 
interests other than downtown redevelopment, the effects of the diverse character of the cultural 
sectors on cultural planning, and the role of prior cultural policy frameworks in shaping 
contemporary policy. In so doing, this case deepens our understanding of the politics and 
processes behind urban cultural policy-making and, while the importance of contextual features 
does not make generalization easy, this approach can be employed to compare policy 
experiences in other places (Grodach and Silver, forthcoming).  
Reinforcing the institutionalist literature, the case illustrates that prior policy agendas and 
external forces establish a path or framework for policy-making, but also that policy actors 
respond to specifically local factors and events, which steer cultural economy planning and 
policy in new directions. In this regard, I found that national or global-level trends-- namely 
26 
 
emphasis on redevelopment in the urban core, the rise of Richard Florida’s creative class thesis 
as an influential “economic imaginary,” and economic recession-- provide an important 
structuring role. However, the impact of these trends on local decisions is translated through the 
lens of the local institutional, organizational, and economic context within which governmental 
and sector-specific interests operate. In this regard, four factors influenced cultural policy-
making in Austin: 1) the “institutional inheritance” of the City’s prior economic development 
and growth management policies that relied on cultural amenities for tech-based economic 
development and smart growth, 2) Austin’s established music scene and the City’s initial 
attention to live music as a cultural industry, 3) departmental organization that positioned 
cultural activity primarily for economic development as well as a wide yet fragmented set of 
commissions that represented specific sectors, and 4) the forum for interaction between 
municipal actors and arts and cultural sector interests created by the cultural planning process.  
 As such, contrary to much of the cultural economy literature, urban cultural policy is not 
determined solely by the adoption of Florida’s creative city strategies by local governments 
interested in promoting downtown redevelopment. While this in part shapes the story, the Austin 
case shows that policy trajectories have a longer history and that a fragmented set of cultural 
sector interests inside and outside government struggle to determine the direction of the creative 
city policy agenda. In Austin, the “economic imaginary” of the creative city did not so much 
establish a new trajectory for cultural planning and policy as it reinforced strategies already in 
place directed toward economically inflected cultural programs and arts amenities particularly 
for downtown redevelopment. As this imaginary became institutionalized through the formation 
of CAD in EGRSO and CreateAustin, it initially provided the capacity for enhanced support of 
the cultural sectors although, despite the use of the creative industry label, policies biased the 
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music industry and related branding efforts. However, the creative city discourse also provided a 
window of opportunity for CAD and cultural sector interests to call for greater recognition of the 
city’s “creative community” based on the argument that the City’s redevelopment agenda 
threatened to displace the creative workforce and businesses that it looked to for economic 
growth. Therefore, the case highlights that with the appropriate institutions and actors in place, 
sectoral coalitions have the potential to adopt the creative city imaginary as a path-shaping 
strategy to shift policy beyond the downtown redevelopment emphasis (Davies, 2002; Jessop and 
Oosterlynck, 2008).  
However, this is no easy task. Despite this opportunity, arts community leaders and CAD 
struggled to incorporate the arts into the larger creative economy and challenge the City’s 
“institutional regime” that focused on image and cultural amenities for central city 
redevelopment. For one, their attempt to transform the meaning and terms of the creative city 
agenda has largely failed because it represents a direct challenge to the established focus on 
redevelopment and smart growth. In short, the City supported expanding the cultural policy 
agenda when it fit with the broader economic development and smart growth goals, but not when 
it was perceived to go against these objectives. This situation is reinforced by the City’s response 
to the recessions during the study period. Whereas the post-dot-com recession (along with the 
creative class discourse) pushed the City toward more comprehensive interest in creative 
industries as part of an effort to broaden the tech-based economic development strategy, the 2008 
recession did the opposite; when cultural sector interests called for more direct support and 
attention to the effects of redevelopment on the cultural sectors, recession served to justify 
backing away from an expanded creative economy program. A second key factor that explains 
the inability to move beyond the City’s amenities-driven agenda is that the cultural sector leaders 
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were not able to resolve long-standing divisions internal to the cultural sectors, which was 
necessary to assemble a unified coalition. Despite the rhetoric of inclusiveness, CreateAustin 
leaders used the plan partly as an opportunity to advance nonprofit arts interests in a city 
dominated by music. In response, the music sector challenged the plan, essentially seeking to 
maintain its dominant position in the city.  
Ultimately, deployment of the creative city label did not unite the diverse interests that 
comprise the cultural sectors. This diversity and the resultant inability of actors in various sectors 
to form a new and unified coalition, identify a clear and cohesive set of demands, and negotiate 
these demands with political leaders contributed greatly not simply to slowing the 
implementation of CreateAustin, but to mounting the challenge to the established agenda that 
defines arts and culture as amenities for economic growth and land development. As such, the 
Austin case illustrates that that no matter how convincing an imaginary, the ability to overcome 
path dependent legacies occurs only in conjunction with significant material and political 
resources (Indergaard, 2009; Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008). Additionally, while the creative city 
label may unite the sectors as an economic field based on some shared criteria, it does not 
necessarily address extant differences. Stronger commercial cultural sectors will hold a 
privileged position in policy-making circles over the arts regardless of their similar needs and 
issues. Austin’s cultural coalition was only minimally successful in shifting policy because they 
were not able to alter the institutional context in which music dominates other cultural sectors 
and where the prevailing conception is that the arts indirectly support economic development as 
an amenity. 
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